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1 Introduction
Before the World War II, nutria (Myocastor coypus), large semi−aquatic rodents indigenous to South
America, were imported to Japan for munitional fur farming industry. During and after the war time, however, a
lot of nutria were released to the wild, either intentionally or not intentionally. In Okayama prefecture, the first
wild−grown nutria was identified in Chayamachi, Kurashiki City, in 19441. Nutria have survived up to now in
many areas in Okayama, and nowadays they are recognized to cause damages to agricultural products due to
their herbivorous activity2. Many local governments in Japan have their own mitigation policies against such
‘invasive’ alien species. In fact, Okayama City, for instance, conducts a kind of nutria control program
consisting of an incentive payment of not more than 1,000 yen per one nutria (cf. 4,000 yen per wild boar)3.
Given such an incentive scheme for the nutria control program of Okayama City, the situation falls into the
category of the commons problem. There is pervasive literature on various versions of the commons problem or
the tragedy of commons. See Hardin (1969), Levhari and Mirman (1980), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), and
Brander and Taylor (1998), just to name a few. The population of nutria in a habitat as a ‘commons’ can be
thought of as a renewable resource stock which is accessible to all the (licensed) trappers, who are the players of
the commons game, and for which the trappers struggle. This paper will try to model this situation in a simplest
possible way so that the resulting model becomes tractable for further modifications and extensions in the
future.
One notable feature of our model is the introduction of some kind of externality to payoff : the cost function
is assumed to be not only increasing in the total amount of harvest (as usually postulated) but also decreasing in
the current resource stock (i.e., the current size of population of nutria). The intuition behind the last part of this
assumption is clear. That just says : ‘trapping one out of a thousand of nutria is easier and hence less costly than
＊ I am indebted to Professor Katsumi Shimono for providing me with information on nutria in Okayama. Needless to say, all possible
remaining errors are solely my responsibility.
１ See e.g．「岡山県大百科事典 上」, pp. 558−559.
2 For some statistics for agricultural damages caused by wild animals in Chugoku and Shikoku areas, see the website of Chugoku−
Shikoku Noseikyoku（中国四国農政局）: http : //www.chushi.maff.go.jp/. See also the website of the Ministry of the Environment
of Japan for the Invasive Alien Species Act and its related topics : http : //www.env.go.jp/.
3 There are some additional requirements for a nutria trapper to receive the incentive payment. For more details, see the website of
Okayama City : http : //www.city.okayama.okayama.jp/keiei/yuugai/yuugai.htm/.
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trapping one out of ten’. The population of nutria grows depending on its current level net of the amount of
harvest by the trappers. This interaction between nutria and trappers can lead to oscillating and even chaotic
population dynamics. The reason why oscillation tends to occur is rather simple. As the size of population of
nutria gets smaller by trapping, the cost of trapping nutria gets higher. Since the incentive payment per nutria is
assumed to be fixed, the increase of costs makes the trapping less lucrative for the trappers and prevents them to
hunt nutria. This in turn stimulates the nutria population to grow again. As the population of nutria recovers its
abundance, the trappers resume trapping, which may significantly reduce the population of nutria again. And the
story repeats itself.
In this paper, we focus, among other things, on the impact of the change in the number of trappers on the
population dynamics of nutria. Roughly speaking, in some typical cases, the fewer trappers are present in the
commons, the more likely to be ‘simple’ the dynamics of population will be, as the population of nutria is
assumed to grow exponentially (rather than to endogenously fluctuate) by itself without any human activity. As
the number of trappers increases, however, fluctuating population dynamics tend to occur due to the effect of the
‘tragedy of commons’ (i.e., overexploitation of resources) together with the aforementioned effect of
externalities involved in the cost function. As the number of trappers increases further, the population of nutria
tends to end up getting harvested away, with some possible complicated transient motions.
2 Description of the model
Let us consider a habitat populated by nutria of population size Nt at the beginning of time t . Time is discrete
and extends from zero to infinity. We suppose that there are n licensed trappers of nutria who each have equal
access to that habitat. Let si t denote the amount of nutria trapped by trapper i i  1 2  n  in time t . The
total amount of trapped nutria in time t , St , is thus given by
St  
i 1n si t (1)
Let C St Nt  be the total (or social) cost function of harvesting St , given the size of population of nutria Nt .
We assume that the total cost function satisfies the following conditions :
(i) C : R2  R is sufficiently smooth ;
(ii)CSt 0 and2CSt2 0 (strictly increasing and convex in St ) ;
(iii)CNt 0 (strictly decreasing in Nt ).
Suppose that the authority pays P yen per unit of nutria (e.g. nutria tail) to a trapper. Furthermore, the
trappers are assumed myopic in the sense that they do not care about their future payoffs. This assumption
implies that each trapper indexed by i solves an optimization problem period by period. The optimization
problem for trapper i in time t is thus formulated as follows :
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max
si t 0 Psi si tSt C St Nt   (2)
subject to
Nt  St (3)
For the symmetric interior Cournot−Nash solutions, the first−order conditions are given by
P  1si t
St
 
C St Nt  
St
si t
St
C St Nt  St ， i 1 2  n (4)
Summing up eqs. (4) from i 1 to n yields
P C St Nt  
St
 1( )C St Nt  St   (5)
where n 1
n
 (6)
Note that 0 1 . The parameter can be interpreted as the intensity of competitiveness. As goes to zero,
the ‘market’ gets more monopolistic. On the contrary, being close to unity means that the market is highly
competitive. In particular, the special case of 0 corresponds to the cooperative case. For simplicity of
analysis, we assume thatcan take any real number in the unit interval 0 1 .
To obtain a concrete and simple model, we assume that the total cost function takes the following quadratic
form :
C St Nt  St 1St( )
Nt
(7)
Given (7), the interior solution St
for the arranged first−order condition (5) is given by
St
PNt 1
2 (8)
Now suppose that the population of nutria evolves according to the following law of motion :
Nt1Nt St , 1 (9)
Note that if there is no human intervention to the nutria habitat, i.e., if St 0 for every t  0, then the
population explodes for any initial condition N0 0. Combining the interior solution Stin (8) and the corner
solution for (2) with the law of motion in (9) gives the dynamics for Nt 	t0
 :
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Nt 1 Nt min Xtmax PNt 120      (10)max 0min L Nt( ) Nt  : f Nt( )
where
L Nt( ) 1  2P( )Nt 2  (11)
Evidently, for any parameter set, f has the property that :
(i) f : R  R  is continuous and piecewise linear ;
(ii) f 0( )0,
(iii) there is a kink at 1P .
3 Dynamic analysis
Since f in (10) is piecewise linear, the possible dynamic patterns of f are relatively well known. Note first
that the slope of the branch corresponding to L in (11) is given by
LN( ) 2P( )
2 (12)
Claim 1 : Suppose P 1. Then for any number of trappers, i.e., for any 	 01 , the sequence Nt 
generated by (10) is monotonically increasing or decreasing for N0 0.
Proof : f is monotonically increasing⇔ LN( )
0⇔ 2P 
. Since	 01 and P 1 by assumption,
we have 2P 
1

0. □
The above proposition says that if the incentive payment P is low enough, then the population dynamics for
nutria are rather simple due to the monotonicity of f , regardless of the number of trappers. On the contrary, the
population dynamics may be more complex when P is high enough :
Claim 2 : Suppose P 2. Then for any number of trappers, i.e., for any 	 01 , f cannot be monotonic. To
be more specific, fN( ) 1 for N 	 01P , and fN( )0 for N 	 1P1P 2 ( ) .
Proof : Evident from the fact that LN( )0⇔ 2P . □
When the incentive payment is moderate, i.e., 1P 2, then whether the map f is monotonically
increasing depends on the number of trappers :
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Claim 3 : Suppose 1 P  2. Then there exists c 2P( ) 01  such that for  0c  , f is
monotonically increasing and that for  c1 , f is not so .
Proof : Again from sign LN( ) sign 2P  , the assertion follows. □
In any case for P 1, f can be non−monotonic depending on the number of trappers, which is a symptom
for complicated population dynamics. In fact, for large sets of parameter values, f exhibits complicated
dynamics. We first show that for a large set of plausible parameter values, f exhibits ‘observable chaos’. By
‘observable chaos’ here we mean that the map f has a (unique) f −invariant probability measure absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. For more mathematical treatments, see Lasota and Yorke (1973)
and Li and Yorke (1978). Let
l P( )2 P
1 and (13)
r BP( )2 1 P . (14)
Note that l P( ) r P( ) for any1 and P 0.
Proposition 1 (Observable Chaos) : Let and P be such that
0 l P( ) 1
If l P( )  min 1r P( ) , then f exhibits observable chaos .
Proof : One can check that l P( ) implies that f is expanding, fN( )	 	
1, on the set on which f is
positive (whenever the derivative exists). Furthermore,  r P( ) implies that f c( ) N c , where c 1P is
the critical point and N c 0( ) is a point such that f N( )0 for N 
N c and f N( )0 for N  0N c . Thus,
we have 0 f 2 c( ) c  f c( ) N c and f I( )I for I  f 2 c( )f c( )  . Hence, f : I  I is piecewise linear
and expanding with a unique critical point c in its interior of I . Consequently, Theorem 1 in Lasota and Yorke
(1973) guarantees that f : I  I admits an absolutely continuous invariant measure, whose uniqueness follows
immediately from the uniqueness of the critical point, due to Theorem 1 in Li and Yorke (1978). □
The above proposition ensures that for every ‘economically meaningful’ (in the sense of Lebesgue) initial
condition in I , the population of nutria eventually keeps fluctuating aperiodically, without becoming extinct,
within a certain set of states (which is in fact a union of one or more closed intervals in I , determined
independently of almost every x I ). For the later use, we will refer to the above situation as the case of
observable chaos .
Contrary to the case where endogenous perpetual fluctuations in the population dynamics are possible, there
are other cases where the nutria become eventually exterminated by the trappers. For mathematical notations
which are not defined here, see e.g. Robinson (1998).
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Proposition 2 (Extermiantion with Transient chaos) : Let  and P be such that
0 r  P( )1
If r  P( )1, then there exists an f−invariant compact set   0N c  such that the restriction of f to is topologically conjugate to the one−sided full−shift on two symbols. Here,  N  0N c  f q N( ) 0N c  q 0 . (15)
Moreover, for any initial value N0∈/  , there exists an integer k k N0( )0 such that f m N0( )0 for m k .
Proof : Condition r  P( )implies that f c( )N c 1P 	2( ), where notations are as in the proof of
the previous proposition. Recalling the unimodal piecewise linear form of f on 0N c  , we see that there are
points N l and N r 0N l c N r N c such that f N l( )f N r( )N c . Let I  0N c  , I0  0N l  ,
and I1  N rN c  . Note that Ii I , I0
I1 , and I0I1 f Ii( ) for i 01 (which is a ‘horseshoe’
condition). Furthermore, there is	1 with fN( ) 	for N Ii for i 01 (which implies hyperbolicity).
Thus, by a usual argument (see e.g. Robinson 1998, Theorem 5.2),  
k0 f	k I0I1( ) is a Cantor set with
f  ( ) and the above statement for the topological equivalence between f  and symbolic dynamics follow.
For the last statement, it suffices to notice that for N I I0I1 , f k N( )0 for k 2, and that for
N I0I1 , there is, by construction of , an integer m 1 such that f m N( )I I0I1 . □
According to the above proposition, for an exceptional but infinite initial set   (of measure zero), the
population of nutria keeps fluctuating in a periodic or aperiodic manner, while for almost all cases the nutria
eventually become extinct. However, because of continuity of f , trajectories close to but not on  will behave
like those on , which causes the population to fluctuate for ralatively long time before it settles down to zero.
Hereafter, we will refer to this situation as the case of extermination with transient chaos.
Now we turn attention to the qualitative as well as quantitative transition of the population dynamics as the
number of trappers varies. As is expected, the number of trappers matters to the long−run behavior of the nutria
population.
Proposition 3 (Dynamic Effects of Changes in the Number of Trappers) : Let P  12 and PP 	1( ). Then there exist two critical values of intensity of competitiveness given by l  P( ) andr  P( ) such that
01 (16)
with the property that
(i) if [0) then the population explodes or converges to a steady state ;
(ii) if   then the case of ‘observable chaos’ occurs as in Proposition 1 ; and
(iii) if (1] then the case of ‘extermination with transient chaos’ occurs as in Proposition 2.
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Proof : Noting that lim   l  P( )lim   r  P( )2P and that l  P( )r  P( ) for any 1 and
P 0, we see that there is  such that the inequalities in (16) hold for   . By simple computations, PP 1( ) suffices. For case (i), there are two subcases : (a) LN( )1 and (b)1LN( )1. For (a),
f has no positive fixed point, and f N( )N for N 0. Thus any trajectory diverges to infinity for N0 0. For
(b), there is a unique positive fixed point N   P  1   2( )  , which is easily seen to be globally
attracting. For cases (ii) and (iii), we can apply the results of Propositions 1 and 2, respectively. □
We can obtain some similar results even for P 2, but we will omit it as it is straightforward.
4 Concluding remarks
We have modeled a commons situation in which n trappers (players) have access to a habitat populated by
nutria (renewable resource stock). Departing from usual assumptions, we have assumed, among other things,
that the current stock of the renewable resource enters the cost function as a factor of externality. Our example
has demonstrated that this type of externality may give rise to strong nonlinearities that can cause several types
of complicated behaviors in the population dynamics of nutria interacting with non−cooperative trappers.
Furthermore, we have notably shown that an increase in the number of trappers can cause drastic changes in
the qualitative as well as quantitative features of the population dynamics. More specifically, depending on the
competitiveness in the nutria commons, the population may : grow unboundedly, converge to a steady state
level, fluctuate chaotically, or getting exterminated in the end with some possible complex transient motions. By
the same token, one could argue how an increase in the pecuniary incentive payment affects the population
dynamics.
It is important to note that along a typical trajectory in the case of observable chaos, the level of population of
nutria oscillates around the steady state. Suppose that for some given number of trappers, the steady state of f is
globally attracting. Suppose then that a new trapper now enters the commons so that f undergoes a bifurcation
to observable chaos, with the steady state becoming unstable. In this case, it is easily seen that the ‘tragedy of
the commons’ does occur at the steady state level : that is, the increase in the number of trappers reduces the
level of steady state population. It is, however, not obvious, due to overshooting, how such an increase in the
number of trappers affects the time average level along a chaotically oscillating trajectory. In such dynamic
situations, it is conjectured that an increase in the number of trappers might increase the level of resource stock
on average. This conjecture is worth examining, but we will leave it for our future research.
Finally, as the recent establishment of the Invasive Alien Species Act in Japan indicates, there occur many
ecological as well as agricultural problems caused by invasive alien species, besides nutria, such as mongoose,
raccoon, black bass, snapping turtle and so on. Since these problems are much wider in scope, applying our
simple model to more complex real practices require a more elaborate model structure. Our findings in the
paper, however, provide at the very least some insights that should be considered in evaluating of policies for
preventing adverse effects on ecosystems caused by invasive alien species.
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On Dynamic Effects of the Number of Players
in a Commons Game : A Tragedy of Nutria in Okayama
Masanori Yokoo
This paper considers a dynamic commons game in relation with mitigation of invasive alien species such as
nutria in Okayama. In our commons game, players (trappers) non−cooperatively seek to maximize their own
payoff by extracting the renewable resource stock (nutria). One key assumption is that the cost of extraction of
the resource is negatively related to the current stock level. For a low level of resource stock, the extraction cost
is high, which makes the extraction less lucrative for the players and which in turn stimulates the renewable
resource stock to regenerate more rapidly. As the resource stock reaches a high level, the reverse process will
start, and this can cause oscillating behaviors. Our simple model proposed here exemplifies that an increase in
the number of players can drastically change the qualitative as well as quantitative features of the dynamics for
the renewable resource stock.
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